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afterwards to the survivors were not issues that either the Jews or the Dutch population in general cared to discuss in public -and again, often not in private either. Van Sas describes the sustaining collective memory of the war as a 'myth of resistance' in which a person could be only hero or blackguard, inherent in which is the image of right and wrong: right = resistance, wrong = collaboration; there are no inbetweens. 3 According to Blom, this memory both informed and was reinforced by Dutch historiography, of which the leading perspective was that of oppression, resistance and collaboration, good and bad. He attributes this right-wrong dichotomy to a deep-rooted consensus that can be traced back to the period immediately after the war and the process of extraordinary justice. 4 In the current transitional justice debate, law, especially criminal law, is seen as wellnigh indispensable in attaining healing for societies torn by traumatic events and for the victims of those events. We only have to look at the discourse surrounding the Internaional
Criminal Court (ICC), political, legal and academic, to discover that international criminal law is assumed to help end impunity, promote retribution, reconciliation and conflict solution, and provide recognition of and redress for victims which will then contribute to conflict resolution, reconciliation etc. in a presumed spiral of fortunate effects. 5 Extraordinary justice in the Netherlands appears to have had much more modest aims, although in its own way it was just as ambitious (and contradictory) as international criminal law, and was in any event seen as an indispensable means of dealing with the past and reinstating social order. However, after the courts had finished, those most affected -the good, the bad and the victims -had very different perceptions of the justice that had been done, indeed of whether justice had been done at all, but their voices were often drowned out in the prevailing good-bad discourse. This contribution asks how, in the social-political context of the time, extraordinary justice coloured perceptions of events, allowing some to flourish and creating a great silence and social division around others. How did those perceptions change, and with them, the nature of public debate? With the benefit of hindsight, the legacy of extraordinary justice may help us understand more about the significance -and limits -of criminal law in processes of transition.
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B. Extraordinary Justice
It is impossible to describe in detail here the inception of extraordinary justice, the ins and outs of its procedures and its gradual development into something different from what had been envisaged. Nevertheless, in order to understand both why the latter happened and what the consequences were, we need some idea of the legal framework, the assumptions upon which it rested and how it developed in practice.
Assumptions and legal framework
As the war progressed, the Dutch government in exile in London began thinking about what should be done with collaborators. 7 They (the Government) felt swift, severe and just action was needed to prevent mob-justice, but, dependent on reports from the Dutch resistance, had These decrees contained vague, multi-interpretable and overlapping provisions and contravened the Dutch Constitution and existing criminal law principles: retro-active criminalisation, the death penalty (abolished in the 19th century), lay judges (forbidden by the Dutch Constitution), the confiscation of a person's entire assets and denial of civil rights (the outlawed Napoleonic practice of 'civil death'); 16 no appeal on the facts, while appeal to the extraordinary supreme court on points of law depended on permission by the trial court.
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The tribunals judged cases brought by members of the public without a public prosecutor on whom the onus of proof rested.
Unforeseen Practicalities and the Solutions
Almost immediately after liberation it was obvious that far too many people were caught up in a system not yet ready to operate (too few high-ranking and respected judges were available 18 and some prospective chairmen objected to the law they would apply, especially mandatory sentencing). Between 120,000 and 150,000 people, some probably innocent, many The purging process also underwent substantive changes, most importantly perhaps because the country would come to a standstill if too many were removed from their jobs. At an early stage, more flexible sanctions and differentiation between categories of seriousness were introduced: 'mistakes' during the war could result in a caution (public or non-public) or demotion; less serious cases were punishable by honourable discharge with no loss of pension rights, and minor cases by demotion; the original decree remained applicable to serious cases only.
In total, after release of the minor cases, the courts and tribunals dealt with approximately 65,000 people, 8% of whom were acquitted, with 16% receiving fines, 60%
sentences of more than five years, 9% between five and ten years, and 3% between ten and 15 years; 578 people were sentenced to more than fifteen years, 148 to life and 152 to death of whom 40 were executed. 25 By 1964, all of the convicted Dutch citizens were free. Most government employees who had been dismissed were rehabilitated by the beginning of the 1950's, successfully campaigning in 1956 for restoration of their pension rights.
From Collective to Individual Retribution
The decrees on extraordinary justice and purging the administration were intended as a system of collective retribution, but the simplistic notion on which they were based -that within the three different 'wrong' groups, all were equally culpable -bore little resemblance to the variations in war-time behaviour. As the legal process went on, it became clear that more scope for individual differentiation was needed. Procedural amendments helped, but the finer shades of distinction are to be found in the sentencing practices through which collective justice evolved into individual justice. At the same time, the idea that everyone should (let alone could) be tried faded into the background, although the underlying reasons differ between the purge and the process of administrative and criminal justice.
Not all supported the collective purge of the Dutch administration: some thought a public servant should remain at his post in 'the interests of the country', 26 others objected to what they saw as discrimination of the 'little man' while the big shots got off. 27 There were indeed large discrepancies in the punishment meted out to civil servants and government employees caught up in the purge (about 10% of the total), among them very high-ranking officials such as mayors and chiefs of police; some were dishonourably discharged and prosecuted, others not. 28 Moreover, the idea of a collective purge of the ideologically unsound contradicted the reality of an administration under occupation.
All who remained in government employment by definition co-operated with enemy, but seldom as intentional collaborators or traitors: there were active collaborators; there were also heroes who sabotaged the enemy's work; the great majority simply got on with the job.
Dealing with the highest officials who had remained in office until the very end soon overshadowed the purge of minor employees that gradually ground to a halt. Romijn attributes this to the power struggle between the new and old elite, it being imperative for the latter that purging the administration did not become a divisive political issue. 29 But there were also considerations of just retribution, of not blaming the lower ranks for following the example of their superiors and of making sure that individual circumstances were taken into account.
The individualisation of sanctions was even more apparent in extraordinary criminal and administrative justice, 30 where sentences gradually became less harsh, most noticeably at the extraordinary courts. The maximum penalty for joining enemy forces, for example, was death, and some death sentences were passed and executed. Over time, courts came to distinguish between the Waffen SS (regarded as most reprehensible) and other branches of the German forces, took into account the youthful age of most volunteers who, after 1947, were no longer prosecuted, and brought the sentence for Waffen-SS'ers down to between eight and 15 years. While it is less easy to discover clear sentencing patterns for the other capital offences, betrayal and collaboration, here too sentences for even very serious crimes became more lenient as the courts discovered that, however immoral a person's behaviour and horrific the consequences, there was always some case that was worse. Eventually, the notion of collective justice was entirely abandoned as courts sought to ensure that the punishment fitted the individual crime.
Although the consequences of many acts of betrayal were the same (the victims died), there were obviously different circumstances, motives and degrees of blame. In 1945, one 27 Romijn, supra note 7, at 20. 28 De Haan, supra note 7, at 88-89; Romijn, supra note 7, at 143 ff. 29 Romijn, supra note 7, at 95-109 30 The following is based on Belinfante, supra note 7, ch. IX-XII.
incident and the death of one person could lead to a death sentence. Later, the death penalty was rare. In 1949, for example, a Dutch 'businessman' who conned several Jews into paying to be 'smuggled to England' then handed them over to the Germans, was sentenced to 15 years in prison. 31 Public officials who had merely done their job did not appear before the extraordinary courts. Only those who had been more than enthusiastic in assisting the occupying forces were prosecuted, with police officers who had hunted down Jews in hiding or betrayed resistance workers receiving harsh sentences until the very end.
It was also clear that severe penalties for low-ranking employees or policemen were problematic considering the bad example often given by superiors. 
A Policy of Pardons
In 1950, the process of extraordinary justice gradually came to an end. A 1949 parliamentary inquiry commission examined the role of government under the occupation but decided the part played by high-ranking civil servants who had 'looked after the country's affairs' after the government fled to London, did not really come under its mandate; it did no more than state that 'some civil servants were insufficiently aware of where to draw the line'. 
C. Perceptions of Justice and Legacies of Silence
Already while extraordinary justice was ongoing, and certainly afterwards, there was a festering pool of dissatisfaction that was to flare up in public debate in the years to come.
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But the specific groups concerned -ex-resistance fighters, Jewish survivors and collaborators -were different, and so too the reasons for their disillusionment. It was partly the legal process itself that led to perceptions that justice had not been done, but this cannot be separated from its socio-political context. These different perceptions, deriving from very different experiences of the war, were not equally represented in public discourse; some were silenced for many years, only to emerge as the respective groups found a voice and the nature of public debate gradually changed.
The Resistance
Those directly and professionally involved or interested (government ministers, judges, legal scholars and practitioners, academics), in short the old elite, felt that extraordinary justice had been a success once the practical problems were solved. But a substantial part of public opinion as represented in the now legal war-time underground press, the new political parties 34 Because there had been public unease about executing the death penalty given that it could not be appealed, by March 1946 death sentences were not carried out anyway unless the Crown had considered a pardon. Those remaining were eventually all commuted to life. 35 Romijn and Schumacher, supra note 25, at 151. Immediately after the war, there was much public interest in the resistance and several ex-members published widely-read memoirs. 40 These set the tone for a discourse of patriotic heroism, 41 
Jewish Survivors
The voice of Jewish survivors recently returned from the camps or re-emerging from hiding was barely heard after the war. In so far as they were directly concerned with extraordinary justice, they, or their now dead family members, were simply individual victims. The process had not done justice to the experience of genocide, but this was something they could not articulate. In the prevailing discourse, Jews were no different from anyone else who survived the war, a reflection of a strict government policy of neutrality: no single category of war victims was to be favoured above others. 'Collective victimisation', 44 however, hid the fact that a tragedy had befallen the Jews that was of a different order to what had happened to the Dutch as a nation, even during the horrendous final year of starvation, lack of fuel and an increasingly brutal occupation, during which thousands died. This 'hunger winter' also fed the population's perception of collective victimisation: granted, the Jews were in camps but we ate tulip bulbs or starved.
Jewish survivors felt betrayed -yet again -on returning to the Netherlands, 45 where they met indifference and sometimes hostility at the borders and in the cities where their own community no longer existed, and struggled to recover confiscated or (mis)appropriated property. In some cases, non-Jewish neighbours refused to return goods entrusted to them for safe-keeping, even expressing open displeasure that the rightful owner had returned alive. Jewish survivors now had a voice, raised that same year in public protest against granting pardons to the last remaining -German -prisoners serving life sentences (the so- (now two, one died in prison) were not released until 1989; both died shortly afterwards in Germany.
Collaborators
Despite the releases and pardons, the efforts of the STPD that latterly had functioned as a reintegration service for political delinquents, and the political stress on rebuilding the country, the reconciliatory ideas of political and social elites were not shared by the population in general. 49 This was partly due to dissatisfaction with extraordinary justice, but there was also anger at the support and housing collaborators received while victims struggled to make ends meet amid a general housing shortage. The STPD noted that many expolitical delinquents found it impossible to find jobs, were shunned by neighbours and that their children were discriminated against by friends and even teachers. 50 In later years, the group was no longer categorically rejected, but their position was difficult enough for them to shroud their past in protective silence. At the same time, many were also angry about the treatment meted out in the first months after liberation and their children grew up in an atmosphere of silent bitterness.
Early attempts to break the silence were met with hostility and disbelief. In 1949, a Dutch fascist published a report on the detention camps, detailing the ill-treatment, starvation rations, torture and even murder of detainees. 51 Although some were shocked, the more so since the facts were corroborated by less suspect sources, 52 the Government took steps to improve the situation and the fuss died away. Only recently has there been serious and detailed research into what happened in this 'forgotten past' (the subtitle of one such publication). 53 As to the fact of collaboration, in 1967 the first attempt to throw some light on who the collaborators were and what their motives, 54 met with a storm of criticism especially from papers that were a continuation of the underground press. Even in the 1980's studies of collaborators received little general attention. 55 Collaborators had always been reluctant to seek a public platform. In 1947, a number of leading ex-NSB members had apologized publicly, but this admission of guilt was not taken seriously and there were no more large scale attempts. 56 According to Tames, while reintegration was certainly not easy and there was no real reconciliation, things were not as bad in practice as the right-wrong discourse would suggest; collaborators were 'allowed'
back, but only in so far as they were prepared to admit their fundamental guilt, making them ever dependent on the conditional good will of others. 57 Their children formed a particularly difficult and vulnerable group, who, for obvious reasons, were both traumatized by the silence and/or the knowledge of who their parents were, and yet could not speak out of loyalty or fear, or both. During the 1980's, they were grudgingly but not widely recognised as one of the groups for whom the war had brought specific traumas. 58 It is, however, only in the past ten years that their individual stories have started to be told.
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D. The bystander role of the Dutch population
If the three specifically dissatisfied groups were eventually able to articulate their feelings, until the end of the millennium neither they nor anyone else managed to put the one subject enduringly smothered by the myth of resistance on the agenda of public debate: the bystander role of the great majority of Dutch citizens. Writing on protests against 'lenient' justice, the director of the STDP noted: 'So many compatriots bear some moral guilt, because … they refused to help those in need. The more they proclaim they were "anti", though in reality "neutral", during the occupation, the louder they are after liberation!' 60 Jews of the Netherlands were highly assimilated and 'clung to the legal options which then proved to be part of the deportation system'. 65 This is with the benefit of hindsight, and so too are explanations as to why the majority and the Dutch administration were so compliant. According to Romijn, protecting the population at large, not its most vulnerable group, was the authorities' priority. In the mixture of force and deceit that the Germans employed, tolerating discrimination of the Jews seemed wiser than protest. But this was a slippery slope and these 'politics of lesser evil' became bankrupt by 1943 when the Germans turned their attention to the Dutch population itself, and evading forced labour in Germany became the acceptable reaction (although many did go).
This attitude on the part of the (highest) authorities partly explains why, when public servants were required to sign the 'declaration of Aryan descent', only seven non-Jews in the whole country refused, or why the gradual exclusion of Jews from public life went ahead so smoothly. 66 When the razzias started in February 1941, there was brief and violent public protest in Amsterdam led by communist dockers (the 'February Strike'); it was put down harshly, but made the Germans more circumspect in rounding up Jews for deportation. Van der Heijden points out that there was comparatively little resistance until 1943 and that armed resistance was also less than in other countries. He puts the compliance of the population down to an inclination to compromise, obedience to authority and trust in the administration. press. 68 While Van der Heijden also doubts how much people knew, the main gist of his study is that the 'grey, middle-of-the-road position of the bystander' made it was easier to avoid trouble and adapt to an increasingly difficult reality. Historians are coming to see this as a continuation of pre-war social and political relations: the capacity of both administration and population to adapt derives from a political culture of accommodation that made contact and cooperation with the Germans possible without its necessarily being (perceived as) collaboration. 69 Part of the Dutch paradox, this also goes some way to explaining the myth of resistance and the great silence that shrouded first the fate of the Jews and later, when the facts were known, the role the Dutch themselves had played in it. Withuis stresses that, because the experience and significance of the war and post-war situation differed for different groups, it was impossible to find a collective narrative for the future. The failure to protect the Jews is hardly a candidate, especially not in a country that regards itself as extremely tolerant. And so the narrative evolved towards oppression and heroic resistance.
The more this is emphasised, however, the more the decidedly unheroic attitude towards the deportations must be denied, notions of 'right' and 'wrong' dominate the debate and, where silence reigns in the absence of a narrative that all can share, post-war traumas are medicalised rather than treated as social problems.
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The new historiography has created a narrative something akin to collective guilt for what happened to the Jews, both during and after the war; there is more understanding of the role of so-called collaborators 71 and certainly of the difficulties their children faced (although to have been the child of 'wrong' parents is a stigma most would prefer to avoid, even today).
Interestingly, as this new truth, 'the guilty Dutch', took hold, studies of the resistance celebrating its heroes began to appear as if to ward off the risk that their memory would succumb to the weight of collective responsibility. Knowing what we know now, it seems extraordinary indeed that the whole process was premised on the ideological-political distinction of right and wrong, so that the offences specifically designed to accommodate the circumstances of the war reflect the notion that all 70 Withuis, supra note 1, at 109. 71 The term 'wartime mayor' became a Dutch expression for a Catch 22 situation: by remaining at his post, he gets his hands dirty; by leaving, he abandons his people. politically unsound individuals -and they alone -were perpetrators. The process therefore aimed at denying the politically unsound a place in society; the sanctions -life sentences, the death penalty, the 'civil death' of total confiscation of assets and denial of civil rights, lustration -were all intended to achieve just that. But in the absence of any connection to wartime realities, this concept could not, by definition, make good on its promises; neither could it do justice to the realities of the crimes and criminals of the occupation. Thus it was preconditioned to leave a legacy of divisiveness.
Extraordinary justice has been criticised for this failure to promote a society conducive to an inclusive debate that could lead to reconciliation. 73 Given that it was founded on notions of exclusion that is hardly surprising. To expect the legal process to lead to reconciliation in such post-conflict situations, probably always asks too much of the criminal law, for it would be to ignore that every legal process is a function of the social and political context in which it operates 74 and, moreover, to conflate law and its application with justice.
A court's verdict is definite and authoritative; closure, not continued debate about what it establishes as legal truth, is its purpose. 75 Justice, like history with which it is closely intertwined, is an open-ended quest for historical truth and understanding. 76 In the context of conflict and transition, justice is a permanent struggle in different theatres of memory, confronting different truths of very complex, traumatic social and political events. It is a collective process and can only be achieved if all can recognise a collective version of the past, or at least the validity of different, contested memories.
If the legal process of extraordinary justice failed, it is because it could not produce even the beginnings of a collective version of the past. That it did produce a divisive rightwrong dichotomy should not surprise: establishing 'wrong' as opposed to right is what criminal trials are about. But there was another inherent mechanism at work that is specific to the underlying ideology of Dutch post-war justice. The truth about the destruction of the Jewish people that emerged from the trials was a patchwork of collaboration and betrayal by individual perpetrators. To betray a Jew was a politically unpatriotic act that usually led to the death of the victim so that the maximum penalty was death (and indeed, death sentences were imposed and carried out), but it was no more nor less than any other act of betrayal that had cost lives. Parallel to the prevailing political and social discourse, victimhood was, literally, 'neutralised', so that the Holocaust as a phenomenon and the particular collective victimhood of the Jews (as opposed to the collective victimhood of the Dutch population as a whole)
were not, and could not be, addressed as specific issues.
Similarly, the identification of perpetrators as unpatriotic and politically unsound individuals buried the difficult moral question of the co-operation of almost the whole administration and the passive attitude of practically the whole population. That releases, pardons and reintegration schemes failed to bring reconciliation any closer despite the rhetoric of rebuilding the nation, is also logical. They were top-down policies that left the past behind and closed off divisions, while reconciliation is an ongoing social dialogue about precisely what it is that divides.
That the path of justice in the Netherlands proved so rough is not simply a result of how its legal component operated. Criminal trials are but are small part of the process of justice itself and few now remember the contribution of extraordinary criminal justice at all.
That criminal courts and tribunals sentenced tens of thousands in a series of trials lasting more than 6 years -no mean feat -is specialized, not general knowledge. Its contribution to a legacy of dichotomous public discourse, however, has proved lasting. The prevailing image of the reckoning, seen on television year after year around liberation day, is of men in oldfashioned raincoats and hats, hands in the air and a placard reading 'traitor' round their necks, 77 Saving the alliteration, best translated as 'Boche-bitches'.
